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cluded estimates of speed when the vehicle was advancing directly towards the witness,2 0 and when the vehicle
was travelling directly towards witness' car at night with
2 2 the Maryits lights on.2 ' In Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter
land Court was asked to exclude the opinion of the witness, who saw the car traveling five blocks from the scene
of the accident only, on the ground of its incredibility.
But the Court refused and left it to the jury, who heard
and saw the witness, to determine what weight it would
give the opinion. The question as to the opportunity of
the witness to judge, under the particular circumstances,
as to the speed of an automobile, has been held, as a general
rule, to go to the
weight of his testimony, rather than to its
23
admissibility.
Under the facts in the Windham case 24 it seems that the
witnesses had a splendid opportunity to judge the speed of
the truck. They had a clear and continuous view of the
defendant's truck for nearly a quarter of a mile. They saw
it coming toward them, as it passed them and as it proceeded on beyond them. Can it be said that their testimony was based on an inference? Knowing their experience with automobiles, does it not seem most probable
that when they undertook to flag the truck down they unconsciously were thinking of the speed of the truck in
terms of miles per hour?

RE-SURVEY WARRANT

-

NAVIGABLE WATERS

-

ADVERSE POSSESSION
Gray v. Gray'
In November, 1938, the caveatee applied for and was
granted a special warrant of re-survey from the Commissioner of the Land Office. Under the authority of this
warrant, a survey of the property mentioned therein was
made, and the surveyor filed his certificate in the office
of the Land Commissioner in May, 1939. A few months
later the caveator filed a caveat to the claim of the caveatee, his objection being: -first, that the caveatee could not
20Sout v. Nehi Bottling Co., 146 So. 720 (La. 1933).
21 Mutti v. McCall, 14 La. App. 504, 130 So. 229 (1930).
22 151 Md. 525, 135 A. 587 (1926).
" 70 A. L. R. 543; 94 A. L. R. 1193.
24 Supra, n. 1.
178 Md. 566, 16 A. (2d) 166 (1940).
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have title to the bed of a small stream which ran through
the property in question, and secondly, that the caveatee
could not claim by adverse possession title to certain lands
which would otherwise belong to the caveator. The order
of the Land Commissioner sustained the caveat, and the
caveatee then filed a motion to amend the certificate so as
to exclude the land to which the caveator claimed title.
This motion was overruled by the order of the Land Commissioner. From both orders the caveatee appealed.
Held: The order sustaining the caveat is affirmed, but the
order overruling the motion to amend the certificate of survey is reversed.
The Court of Appeals sustained the caveator in both of
these contentions. The Court found that the stream in
question was navigable, and that therefore Section 48 of
Article 542 of the Code prevented the State from issuing
a patent in fee to its bed to the caveatee. The Court also
stated that the land claimed by adverse possession had
been patented by the state prior to 1819, and that as a
result, by virtue of Section 10 of Article 57 of the Code,'
the land in question was incapable of being claimed by
adverse possession. These two rulings represent the subject matter of the present note.
The Court found that the stream, the bed of which was
claimed by the caveatee, was navigable. Testimony indicated that the width of the stream was at some points not
over eighteen feet, and that its depth ranged from two and
a half to three feet. Expert testimony was taken to show
that the stream could be navigated by small boats at the
point in question. The evidence also showed that the
tide ebbed and flowed both above and below the land
claimed by the caveatee. With this testimony before it,
the Court of Appeals quoted with approval the following
test of navigability:
"The test of navigability of a river, as stated by the
Supreme Court of the United States is that these rivers
are navigable in law when they are used, or are susceptible of being used in their ordinary condition, as
highways of commerce over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in
the customary modes of
'4
trade and travel on water.
2 This section of
the Code is the same in both Bagby's 1924 Code, and
Flack's 1939 Code.
Ibid.
'Supra, n. 1, 16 A. (2d) 170, quoting 27 R. C. L. 1303.
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By quoting and following the above rule5 the Court thereby applied the test of the Civil Law in determining the
navigability of the stream in question, (namely, navigability in fact) a test which is adopted by the weight of
authority in this country.6 Although this is the rule in
most of the jurisdictions in this country, Maryland, in the
majority of its previous cases which called for a determination of what constituted navigable waters, applied the
Common Law test to answer this question, namely whether
the tide ebbs and flows at the point under consideration.
That Maryland had adhered to the common law test in
the past is easily demonstrated by a brief reference to the
important cases which have placed this subject before the
Court of Appeals. One of the earliest cases found in our
reports which dealt with navigable waters is the case of
Browne v. Kennedy.7 There, a shallow stream, admittedly incapable of floating large boats and which was
gradually being filled in, was treated nevertheless as a
navigable stream.
The next important decision was Benney's Case."
There, the question before the Chancellor was whether
the Potomac River, above the ebb and flow of the tide,
was navigable in law. In argument it was shown that this
section of the river had been used for many years for navigation by small boats, and that during the French and
Indian War the river had been ascended as high as Cumberland by boats carrying military stores for Braddock's
Army. But, in light of all these facts, the Chancellor held
that the river was not navigable because of the turbulent
and swift nature of its current, and because the point in
question was above the ebb and flow of the tide.
In 1862, Article 54, Section 48 of the Code was enacted.
This provided that no patent for land covered by navigable
waters could be issued by the state. In the following year,
a case was before the Court to determine the navigability
of a stream in connection with this statute.' There, although it appeared that the stream was capable of floating
small craft, the Court held that rivers and streams within
6 This generally accepted definition of navigability was first set forth by
the Supreme Court in The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563, 19 L. Ed. 999, 1001
(1871).
6 See 45 C. J. 403 ff.
In justification for this departure from the English
rule by the courts of this country, it can be noted that, while in England
most of the streams which are navigable in fact are also tidal, this cannot
be said with respect to the rivers in the United States.
75 H. & J. 195, 203 (Md. 1821).
8 2 Bland 99 (Md. 1829).
9 Day v. Day, 22 Md. 530 (1865).
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the ebb and flow of the tide to highwater mark are navigable waters. The same result was reached two years
later in the case of Patterson v. Gelston,10 and again was
cited and followed in Garitee v. Baltimore."
Perhaps the leading case in Maryland on the question
of navigability is the case of Sollers v. Sollers.12 It was decided in that case that a shallow cove which was near the
Patuxent River was navigable. It does not appear from
the report of the Sollers case whether the cove was navigable in fact, i. e., whether it was susceptible of being
used for the purpose of commerce and travel, and yet the
Court held that since the cove was tide water it was navigable under the Maryland rule.
Thus the question of what streams are navigable was
well settled in Maryland, and continued to be so until 1916.
In that year the Court decided the case of Mayor and City
3
There, the Court
Council of Havre de Grace v. Harlow."
was called upon to decide whether the upper regions of
the Susquehanna River were navigable. The Court recognized the two tests to determine navigability, and then
devoted more than two pages of its decision to quoting
from the Civil Law. 4 The Court decided that the best
solution to the conflicting views was that the question of
navigability should be decided on the facts of each particular case, and on the requirements of the public as to the
use of a particular stream, rather than on any particular
use of the water at the present time.
In the light of this decision, and because the Court
quoted at such length from the Civil Law tests, it might
have been felt that at last Maryland had abandoned the
old Common Law rule. Possibility for such interpretation
was both recognized and repudiated in the next Maryland case which passed on the question of navigability. In
Linthicum v. Shipley,' 5 the Court said:
"It is abundantly established by the testimony of
all the witnesses that the water covering the land
cannot be used for the purpose of commerce and
10 23 Md. 432, 445 (1865).
11 53 Md. 422, 433 (1880). A case indirectly passing on the subject of
navigable waters is that of Hess v. Muir, 65 Md. 586, 5 A. 540 (1886).
There the court affirmed the rule which stated that the prohibition of granting a patent of land covered by navigable waters is not inconsistent with a
license to locate lots for the planting of oysters.
22 77 Md. 148, 26 A. 188, 20 L. R. A. 94, 39 Am. St. Rep. 404 (1893).
18 129 Md. 265, 98 A. 852 (1916).
S'
Supra, n. 13, 129 Md. 271-275.
15140 Md. 96, 116 A. 871, 23 A. L. R. 754 (1922).
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travel, and that is the well established test in most
of the states in this country. It does not seem to have
been adopted in this state unless the recognition of
the general rule in Havre de Grace v. Harlow had the
effect of overruling earlier decisions of the court."1
The Court then quoted at great length from the Sollers
case and decided that the question was determined by the
ebb and flow of the tide.
In the late case of Toy v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.,"
the Court, although the question was not squarely before
it, recognized the Common Law rule. In that case it was
decided that a small creek was navigable since the tides
regularly rose and fell at the point in question, although
its capacity for useful floatage was limited by the depth
of the channel.
From a review of the Maryland cases it can be seen,
therefore, that although at times the Civil Law test of navigability has been referred to, and although at other times
the same result would have been reached no matter
whether the Common Law or the Civil Law tests had been
applied, 8 yet it cannot be doubted that our decisions have
adhered to the old Common Law cases to determine
whether or not a given body of water was navigable in
law. It is submitted that in light of the weight of American authority, and in view of the recent but already celebrated case of United States v. AppalachianElectric Power
Co.,' 9 decided by the Supreme Court, the old Maryland
position is not the better one.
The question remains, however, as to whether the
Court of Appeals, in the present case, abandoned the
Common Law rule. If it did not, the testimony as to the
10 Supra, n. 15, 140 Md. 98.
17 176 Md. 197, 4 A. (2d) 757 (1939).
IS In many cases arising in Maryland, the stream in question would be
determined as "navigable" no matter whether the Common Law or the
Civil Law test were applied. The reason for this is that streams in which
the tide ebbs and flows are usually capable of navigation in fact. The
creek in the present case affords a good example of this situation, for it
was testified both that the tide ebbed and flowed at the point in controversy, and also that the stream could float small craft.
"9The most recent and perhaps the most exhaustive opinion by the
Supreme Court on the question of "navigability" Is the case of United
States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 61 S. Ct. 291, 85 L. Ed. 201
(U. S. 1940). The court qualified its former test (quoted in Gray v. Gray
and in the present note), stating that to appraise the evidence of navigability on the natural conditions only of the waterway was erroneous. The
court held that a waterway, otherwise suitable for navigation, is not barred
from that classification merely because artificial aids must make the highway suitable for use before commercial navigation may be undertaken.
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navigability in fact of the creek under consideration, and
the long quotation from the old Supreme Court test were
mere surplusage. For it was established by the evidence
that the tide ebbed and flowed in the section of the stream
which passed through the controversial area, and if the
Common Law test were still the rule, the decision of the
Court could have been based on this fact alone.
After disposing of the question of navigability, the
Court then turned its attention to the caveatee's claim of
adverse possession. It was shown that the land which
was the subject of the averred adverse possession was originally patented to one Gray by virtue of a patent issued by
the State in 1792, and by means of various conveyances is
now owned by the caveator. The Court held that regardless of any adverse possession that could be shown by the
caveatee, the land in question was not capable of being
claimed by adverse possession. This decision was based
on Section 10 of Article 57 of the Code which reads:
"Whenever land shall be taken up under a common
or special warrant, or warrant of re-survey, escheat or
proclamation warrant, any person, body politic or
corporate may give in evidence under the general
issue his possession thereof; and if it shall appear in
evidence that the person, body politic or corporate, or
those under whom they claim have held the lands in
possession for twenty years before the action brought,
such possession shall be a bar to all right or claim derived from the State under any patent issued upon
such warrant; but nothing herein contained shall apply to any warrant laid before the 26th day of January,
1819."
The Court held in effect that by virtue of this statute, no
land that was patented from the state before 1819 could
be the subject of adverse possession. To reach this conclusion the Court stated:
"The area sought to be excluded by the amendment, as we have observed, was shown by the survey
to be a part of the area included in a patent issued
as far back as 1792, and regardless of the alleged adverse possession thereof, which the caveatees in their
proof attempted to establish, was not the subject of
20
adverse possession. Code, Art. 57, Section 10.11
20 Supra, n. 1, 16 A. (2d)
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It is questionable whether Section 10 of Article 57 had
the effect of completely abolishing the established Common Law rules of adverse possession in respect to lands
patented before 1819. It is certainly true that the doctrine
of adverse possession was recognized in Maryland at an
early time,2 ' and although the Court recognized that the
doctrine could not be applied against the State,2 2 yet it was
applicable against the Lord Proprietary.
Granting, therefore, that the doctrine was fully established in this state when the Statute was passed, can any
reason be advanced why the Legislature should pick out
one type of land, i. e., land patented before 1819, and arbitrarily say that such land would no longer be subject to
adverse possession? The reason, if one exists, is hard to
perceive. For, if this is the correct interpretation of
Article 57, Section 10, a great body of the land in Maryland has been made subject to the rule that it is incapable
of being claimed by adverse possession, since it is conceivable that most of the land in this State was patented
before 1819. There is no apparent justification for such a
change in the substantive law by the Legislative enactment.
What, then, was the purpose of this act? One explanation, and perhaps the most likely, is that it gave to one
who had been living on State lands openly and adversely
a means by which he might defeat any patent sought by
or issued to another, although it was and remained impossible to hold adversely against the State as a general
proposition. Probably, before the passage of this act one
could not assert prior holding against the patentee because
he could not hold adversely against the State. That is,
if A went into possession of state lands in 1750, and B obtained a patent to said lands on a warrant laid in 1780, A
could not invalidate B's title by the showing of his adverse
possession. The reason was that since no adverse possession could be shown against the State, A's possession
from 1750 to 1780 would avail him of nothing, and as a
21 See for a recognition of the doctrine: Hammond v. Warfield, 2 H. & J.
151 (Md. 1806) ; Davidson v. Beatty, 3 H. & McH. 594 (Md. 1797) ; Cresap
v. Hutson, 9 Gill 269 (Md. 1850) ; Casey v. Inloes, 1 Gill 430 (Md. 1844) :
Gwynn v. Jones, 2 G. & J. 173 (Md. 1830) : Alexander v. Walter, 8 Gill 239
(Md. 1849) : Hammond v. Ridgely, 5 H. & J. 245 (Md. 1821) ; Gibson v.
Martin, 1 H. & J. 545 (Md. 1805).
-'2Hall v. Gittings, 2 H. & J. 112 (Md. 1806).
- Adverse possession held to apply against the Lord Proprietary in Russell v. Baker, 1 H. & J. 71 (Md. 1800); Kelley v. Greenfield, 2 H. & McH.
121 (Md. 1785) ; contra, Baltimore v. Evans, 4 H. & McH. 482 (Md. 1725)
Steuart v. Mason, 3 H. & .J. 507 (Md. 1815) : Lux v. Pellet, 1 H. & J. 83
(Md. 1791).
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result the State would be free to grant a clear title to the
patentee irrespective of such possession of A.
This situation was changed, however, by the enactment
of Article 57, Section 10. That statute provides that when
lands are taken up under warrants of resurvey, and patents
are issued thereon by the State, any person may show his
adverse possession of those lands for a period of twenty
years before the action was brought, and thus defeat the
title patented by the State to the patentee. Thus if A
went into possession of State lands in 1820, and B applied
for a patent to the same lands in 1850, A could show his
adverse possession for the statutory period, and thus bar
any claim that might vest in B by virtue of the patent. -4
It follows, therefore, that the practical effect of the statute
was to allow a claim of adverse possession of State lands
to defeat a subsequent patent issued on those lands by the
State, whereas
before the passage of the statute this could
25
not be done.
Can it be said from the foregoing discussion that the
statute by its exception abolished the law of adverse possession as to all state lands patented prior to 1819? Before
the act was passed there was no question but that one
could obtain good title by a showing of adverse possession
of any lands patented by the State. If A obtained a patent
to a piece of land in 1750, and B later came on the land and
claimed adversely to him for 20 years, B obtained a good
title. B was not holding adversely to the State in such
case, but adversely to the patentee. It will be observed
that the land was patented before 1819, and that the laws
of adverse possession were as applicable to it as they were
to any other land. There is no reason why that should
have been changed by the statute. It is submitted that
the exception proviso at the end of the statute was merely
a legislative stipulation that the statute was not to be retroactive. Hence, any adverse possession claimed before 1819
could not be used to defeat a patent issued by the State on
that land, whereas such possession after 1819 could be used
as a bar to the claim of the patentee. A simple illustra24 This contention was raised by the claimant in Mitchell v. Mitchell, 1
Md. 44 (1851). In that case a party claiming adverse possession from
1817 to 1841 failed to prove that there was no subsisting title in the state
(luring this period. The court answered his argument by stating that even
if the statute could have such a construction, Its proviso clause would
prevent it from applying where the patent was not issued until after 1819
upon a warrant laid before 1819.
25 This contention seems to have been justified by tne dicta in the later
case of Davis v. Furlow. 27 Md. 536 (1867). To the same effect see Newman v. Young. 30 Md. 417 (1869).
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tion will bring this point out. If A went onto State lands
in 1810 under a claim of adverse possession, and B obtained
a warrant of resurvey in 1817 on which was issued a patent, A could not defeat B's title in 1830 by a claim of adverse possession for a period of twenty years. The reason
is that the statute, by the controversial proviso, specifically
excepts out of its scope the showing of any indirect adverse
possession against the State before 1819, which would
prevent the State from granting a valid patent on a warrant laid before 1819. Simply stated, therefore, the adverse possession claimed by A between the dates of 1810
and 1819 could avail him nothing, because the statute
which provides that such adverse possession might be
shown in an appropriate case was passed in 1819, and by
its own provision was not made retroactive.
But in the same illustration used above, granting that
the title patented to B at the outset was clear from any
claim of adverse possession, can it be said that if A stayed
on the land until 1840 he could not claim a good title by
adverse possession? Neither the statute nor the proviso
clause are any authority for this position. If the patent
were issued to B in 1817, and A, being already on the land,
continued to claim adversely until 1840, there should be
no question but that the ordinary rules of adverse possession apply, and that A, by showing such possession, would
gain a good title to the land.26 The holding in Gray v.
Gray contrary to this position does not seem to be sound.
Another possible purpose of this statute might have
existed, namely, that it conferred on the Land Commissioner certain equitable jurisdiction that enables him to
hear claims of adverse possession, made by third parties,
in a patent proceeding pending before him.17 It should be
borne in mind that the statute deals with lands "that shall
be taken up" under various types of warrants which the
Land Commissioner has the power to grant. The act then
provides that when such lands are taken up, a third party
2 The most striking example of this illustration is the case of Morgan
v. Slider, 22 Md. 267 (1864). In an action in ejectment, the plaintiff relied
on a patent issued to him by the state in 1849, which was based on a
common warrant of resurvey issued as far back as 1792. The defendant
proved a claim of adverse possession that started in 1805 and continued to
1864. Although both the patent procedure and the adverse possession were
initiated before 1819, the court held that defendant got good title. No
mention was made of Article 57, Section 10, but the court said that the
doctrine of adverse possession was too well settled to go into a discussion
of the authorities.
27 The title of the Act is some basis for this contention. The Act was
titled, "An Act to Quiet Possession and Prevent Suits at Law." Laws of
Maryland, Vol. 6, Ch. 90 (1818).
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may come in under the proceedings, and by means of the
general issue plea may show his adverse possession of said
land for a period of twenty years. The statute then provides that if the third party can show such possession, he
may bar any claim derived from the state under a patent
issued on the warrant. From this analysis it is clear that
the statute provides the legal machinery by which one
claiming adverse possession might become a party to the
original patent procedure,' and thereby defeat the title
claimed by the patentee without resorting to any other
legal or equitable procedure.2 9
Under this second interpretation of the statute, the exception would not be said to remove all lands patented
before 1819 from the application of the doctrine of adverse
possession. It is more reasonable to believe that the clause
in question merely prevented the statute from applying
to any patent procedures that were then before the Land
Commissioner at the time the statute went into effect. As
to such pending procedure, and as to all completed procedures that had been before the Land Commissioner, no
such equitable jurisdiction was conferred, and third persons claiming title by adverse possession would have to
resort to the customary bill in equity to quiet title in order
to obtain relief.
It is submitted, therefore, that the Court of Appeals, in
stating that Section 10 of Article 57 removed all lands
patented before 1819 from the doctrine of adverse possession, has made an erroneous interpretation of that statute.
211
In Chapman v. Hoskins, 2 Md. Ch. 485 (1851) the right of a caveator
to prove adverse possession in a proceeding before the Land Commissioner
was recognized.
29 It is very questionable whether a suit to quiet title can be brought by
an adverse possessor in Maryland since the decision in McCoy v. Johnson.
70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889). In that case the Court of Appeals held
that a title based upon adverse possession must first be proved in an action
at law. However, there is no common law action under which a title by
adverse possession can be proved as long as the adverse possessor remains
in possession. Possibly under the new Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act,
Md. Code (1939) Art. 31A, a judgment declaring the title of the adverse
possessor can be obtained.

